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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over orders, judgments and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code § 
78-2-2(3)(j); In the Matter of the General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water. 
2004, P.3d (2004 UT 106). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal raises a single issue of first impression: Can a water right be acquired 
by seven years of adverse use which commenced prior to but is not completed until after 
such use was outlawed by the 1939 legislature? The issue was the focus of extensive 
briefing by both parties. The district court addressed the issue in its Memorandum 
Decision. Addendum 4, 7-16, TR 910-918. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court's determination involved the interpretation and application of 
various statutes governing the acquisition and forfeiture of water rights under Utah law. 
"The interpretation of a statute . . . presents a question of law. . . . " Id., ^ 16, quoting 
Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, f 4, 53 P.3d 473. "A trial court's 
determination of law is reviewed under a correctness standard; we afford no degree of 
deference to a trial judge's determination of the law." Id., f 16, quoting United States 
Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ^ 9, 79 P.3d 945." 
1 
STATUTES RELEVANT TO APPELLATE REVIEW 
As a preface to setting forth relevant statutes, I make the following explanation. 
The statutes governing both the acquisition mil forfeiture of water rights evolved 
between 1888 and 1939. Much of the evolution was influenced by decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Such will be discussed during the argument portion of this brief. 
Relevant provisions of statutes during this time frame are set forth hereafter verbatim, 
with the full text of the statutes included in Addendum 5 filed with this brief pursuant to 
authorization of URAP Rule 24(a) (11). To aid the reader, the statues are organized 
chronologically and include a comment regarding their relevance to the adverse use claim 
which is the subject of this appeal. 
1888 - COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH, VOLUME II, CHAPTER 11 
§ 2780. s 6. A right to the use of water for any useful purpose, such as for 
domestic purposes, irrigating lands, propelling machinery, washing and sluicing 
ores, and other like purposes, is hereby recognized and acknowledged to have 
vested and accrued, as a primary right, to the extent of, and reasonable necessity 
for such use thereof, under any of the following circumstances: 
1. Whenever any person or persons shall have taken, diverted and used 
any of the unappropriated water of any natural stream, water course, lake, or 
spring, or other natural source of supply. 
2. Whenever any person or persons shall have had the open, peaceable, 
uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period of seven years. 
§ 2783. s 9. A continuous neglect to keep in repair any means of diverting, 
or conveying, water, or a continuous failure to use any right to water, for a period 
of seven years at any time after the passage of this act, shall be held to be 
abandonment and forfeiture of such right. 
[RELEVANCE: At this early time in Utah Territory history there existed a statutory 
basis for acquiring a water right not only by appropriation (I), but by continuous use (2). 
The language relating to use is typical of what is known as adverse use. There was also a 
seven-year forfeiture provision.] 
2 
1897-SESSION - HAPTERLII 
SECTION 1. The rights to the use of any of the unappropriated waters of 
the State PUJ> be acquired by appropriation. 
t:<, Hie appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, 
and when the appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use 
the water for a period of seven years the right ceases; but questions of 
abandonment shall be questions of fact, and shall be determined as are other 
questions of fact. 
Sec. 25. Any person who shall take or use more water than he is entitled to 
or has been allotted to him by a proper officer, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall be liable in damages to any corporation, company or 
individual injured by such unlawful taking. 
[RELEVANCE: I his is the second session after statehood. The provision for acquiring 
water right by adverse use was not included. The forfeiture provision remained intact; a 
criminal offense for taking or using water without entitlement was enacted.] 
1898 - REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PREFACE. On the admission of the state into the Union it was found necessary 
to provide for a general revision of the laws. Chapter eighty-five of the laws of 
eighteen hundred and ninety-six authorized the appointment by the governor of a 
commission to revise, codify, and annotate the laws of the state I he bill 
provided, and it was enacted, that it should take effect oiI January first, eighteen 
hundred and ninety-eight, that all laws enacted prior to the second regular session 
of the legislature [1897], saving a few expressly enumerated, should be repealed, 
and that all other acts of the legislature at its second regular session should have 
effect as subsequent statutes and as repealing any portion of the revision 
inconsistent therewith, 
TITLE 33. IRRIGATION OF WATER RIGHTS. 
1261. Water right acquired by appropriation, [he rights to the use of any of 
the unappropriated waters of the state may be acquired by appropriation. [C.L. § 
2780*;'97, p. 219. 
1262. Id. Must be for useful purpose. Abandonment. The appropriation must 
be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his 
successor in interest abandons or ceases to use the water for a period of seven 
years the right ceases; but questions of abandonment shall be questions of fact, 
and shall be determined as are other questions of fact. [C.I,. §§ 2780*. 2783*; 
'97. n. 219. 
3 
1285. Unlawful taking of water. Penalty, Any person who shall take or use 
more water than he is entitled to or has been allotted to him by a proper officer, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable in damages to any 
corporation, company, or individual injured by such unlawful taking. ['97, p. 225. 
[RELEVANCE: As stated in the PREFACE, the general revision and codification 
resulted in the repeal of laws enacted before the second annual session (1897) unless 
noted. The appropriation, forfeiture and unlawful taking provisions adopted in 1897 
were included and assigned code numbers as shown. The adverse use provision was not 
retained and never again appears in Utah's statutes.] 
1903 - SESSION LAWS. CHAPTER 100. WATER RIGHTS AND 
IRRIGATION. 
SECTION 1. Office of State Engineer. There shall be a State Engineer, 
who shall be appointed by the Governor of the State and be confirmed by the 
Senate. He shall hold his office for the term of four years and until his successor 
shall have been appointed and qualified. He shall have general supervision of the 
waters of the State and of their measurements, apportionment and appropriation. 
Sec. 34. Rights to unappropriated water. Rights to the use of any of the 
unappropriated water in the State may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner 
hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some 
useful or beneficial purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one first in time 
shall be first in right. 
Sec. 35. Application to be made for rights. Any person, corporation or 
association, to hereafter acquire the right to the use of any public water in the 
State of Utah, shall before commencing the construction, enlargement or 
extension of any ditch, canal or other distributing works, or performing similar 
work tending to acquire the said right or appropriation, make an application in 
writing to the State Engineer. . . . 
Sec. 50. When right ceases, reversion. When the appropriator or his 
successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of seven years, 
the right ceases, and thereupon such water reverts to the public and may be again 
appropriated, as provided in this act; but questions of abandonment shall be 
questions of fact, and shall be determined as are other questions of fact. 
[RELEVANCE: This is the basic appropriation statute which remains in effect. It 
established the office of the State Engineer and provided that the exclusive means of 
4 
acquiring a water right is by application filed with the State Engineer. The "beneficial 
use" language \\ as shifted from the forfeiture provision to the appropriation provision.] 
1919 SESSION LAWS 
•" CHAPTI-'K h vVAfl'R \H\) WAIH< KhilllM - . 
[forfeiture provision] 
Sec. 6 Nonuse i cappropriation. When an appropriator or his successor 
in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of five years, the right 
ceases, and thereupon such water reverts to the public, and may be again 
appropriated, as provided in this Act. [The 1919 change to five years has been 
emphasized by italics.] 
[general adjudication provision] 
Sec. 20. Determination of rights, I Jpon a verified petition to the State 
Engineer, signed by five or more water users upon any stream or water source, 
requesting the determination of the relative rights of the various claimants to the 
waters of such streams or water source, it shall be the duty of the State Engineer, 
if upon investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to justify, to 
make a determination of said rights, . . . 
[necessity of filing claim] 
Sec, 24. Time for filing and contents of statement. Each person, 
corporation or association claiming a right to use any water of said river system or 
water source shall, within sixty days after the service of such notice mentioned in 
the preceding section, file in the office of the clerk of the district court, a 
statement in writing which shall be signed and verified by the oath of the 
claimant, and shall include as near as may be the following: , [Detailed 
identification of claimed water right required. .] 
|ii uniiM qiHiiiu" loi di i l i i ir In l i lc | 
Sec. 29. Effect of statement - failure to make operates as a bai 
proviso as to actual notice. The filing of each statement by a claimant shall be 
considered notice to all persons, corporations and associations of the claim of the 
party making the same, and any person, corporation or association failing to make 
and deliver such statement of claim to the clerk of the court within the time 
prescribed by law shall be forever barred and estopped from subsequently 
5 
asserting any rights and shall be held to have forfeited all rights to the use of said 
water theretofore claimed by him; . . . . 
[appropriation provision] 
Sec. 41. Acquisition of right to use - purpose - order - more beneficial 
use. Rights to the use of the unappropriated public water in the State may be 
acquired by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. 
. . . [Same language since 1903.] 
[application required] 
Sec. 42. Procedure to acquire right to use unappropriated water. Any 
person who is a citizen of the United States or who has filed his declaration to 
become such, as required by the naturalization laws, or any association of such 
citizens or declarants, or any corporation, in order hereafter to acquire the right to 
the use of any unappropriated public water in the State of Utah, shall, before 
commencing the construction, enlargement or extension of any ditch, canal, or 
other distributing works, or performing similar work tending to acquire the said 
right or appropriation, make an application in writing to the State Engineer. 
[Adds language regarding citizenship. Otherwise maintains same application 
provisions in place since 1903.] 
[water commissioners appointed by State Engineer] 
Sec. 62. Water Commissioners and deputies - salary and expenses -
suits on same. Wherever in the judgment of the State Engineer, or the district 
court, it is necessary to appoint a water commissioner, or deputy commissioner for 
the distribution of water from any river system or water source, such 
commissioner or deputy commissioner shall be appointed by the State Engineer. 
[enforcement responsibility] 
Sec. 64. Duties of State Engineer - district waters - enforcement of 
orders and judgments - duties of State Attorneys. The State Engineer and his 
duly authorized assistants shall carry into effect the judgments of the courts in 
relation to the division, distribution or use of water under the provisions of this 
Act. The State Engineer shall divide, or cause to be divided, the water within any 
district, created under the provisions of this Act, among the several appropriators 
entitled thereto in accordance with the right of each respectively, and shall 
regulate and control, or cause to be regulated and controlled, the use of such 
water. . . . 
6 
[power to arrest and initiate charges] 
Sec. 6 7. Power to make complaints and arrests, i nc Mate Engineer, or 
any Water Commissioner, within his district shall have power to arrest any person 
or persons violating any of the provisions of this Act, and turn such person or 
persons over to the sheriff of the proper county, and immediately upon delivering 
any such person or persons so arrested into the custody of the sheriff, it shall be 
the duty of the State Engineer or Water Commissioner making such arrest to 
make complaint in writing and upon oath before the proper just ice of the peace or 
to the district court against the person or persons so arrested. 
[RELEVANCE: Most notable, the period for forfeiture was changed from se\ }en years 
to five years (Sec. 6.) Provisions were adopted for a general adjudication (Sec. 20) which 
immediately thereafter were relied upon in the general adjudication of the Sevier Ri\ er 
Basin Water claimants were obliged to file claims. (Sec. 24.) Failure to file constitutes 
forfeiture of right (Sec. 29.) The act retained the same language defining the exclusive 
method of appropriating water. (Sec. 41. and Sec. 42.) State Engineer authorized to 
appoint water commissioners (Sec. 62) with shared duty to enforce judgments (Sec. 64) 
and with power to arrest and initiate charges (Sec. 67).] 
1933 - REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH 
TITLE 100. WATER AND IRRIGATION. 
100-1 4 Reversion to Public - By Abandonment en F ailure to Use, 
When an appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use 
water for a period of five years the right ceases, and thereupon such water reverts 
to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title. (L. 19, p. 
177, §6.) 
1 Only Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be 
acquired by appropriation in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. 
103-59-1 Interfering With Control of Water Commissioner. 
Ev e ry person who in any way interferes with or alters the flow of water in 
any stream, ditch or lateral while under the control or management of any water 
commissioner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (C.L. 17, § 8514.) 
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[RELEVANCE: The provisions relating to appropriation, forfeiture and the criminal 
offenses remain essentially unchanged except they were renumbered.] 
1935 - SESSION LAWS 
CHAPTER 104. WATER AND IRRIGATION. 
100-1-4. Reversion to Public - By Abandonment or Failure to Use Within 5 
Years - Extending Time. 
When an appropriates or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use 
water for a period of five years the right shall cease, and thereupon such water 
shall revert to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title, 
unless before the expiration of such five-year period the appropriator or his 
successor in interest shall have filed with the state engineer a verified application 
for an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to resume the use 
of such water and unless pursuant to such application the time within which such 
nonuse may continue to be extended by the state engineer as hereinafter provided. 
. . . [Emphasis added to the new language adopted.] 
[Extensive language was thereafter included outlining precisely what was required for the 
applicant to be granted the extension and avoid the forfeiture. If an extension were 
granted, forfeiture would result for failure to strictly comply. {See the attached 
addendum for the full text).] 
100-3-1. Only Manner of Acquiring Water Rights, 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be 
acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made 
and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the 
state engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. . . . 
[Emphasis added to the new language adopted.] 
[RELEVANCE: The 1935 Legislature significantly strengthened both the forfeiture 
statute and the appropriation statute. The forfeiture statute (100-1-4) was amended to 
allow an extension for non-use beyond five years, but only by filing before the expiration 
of the five years and by strict compliance with the terms of the extension. The 
appropriation section (100-3-1) was rewritten so the "application" requirement is 
specifically included within the appropriation section rather than by general reference to 
other provisions. It was thereby specifically tied to the "not otherwise" language which 
had been in force since 1903. The changes are relevant because they were in force when 
Defendant claims to have commenced the adverse use on December 1, 1936, the day 
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following entry of the general adjudication decree (Cox Decree) of the Sevier River 
Drainage.] 
1939 - SUPPLEMENT TO THE UTAH REVISED STATUTES < )h I«»\ \ 
PREFACE. This supplement brings the laws contained in the 1933 Revision of 
the Statutes of Utah down to January 1, 1939, with all amendments, additions of 
new statutes, and repeals indicated. 
[RELEVANCE: Includes the 1935 amendments and reflects the law in effect when 
Defendant commenced its claimed adverse use.] 
1939-SESSH • passedMarcJ. li d i e d Maid. ;i>, I'J i'< i. 
100-1-4. Reversion to Publi* In \ li * it : n Failure to Use Within 5 
Years - Extending Time, 
When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to 
use water for a period of five years the right shall cease, and thereupon such water 
shall revert to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title, 
unless before the expiration of such five-year period the appropriator or his 
successor in interest shall have filed with the state engineer a verified application 
for an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to resume the use 
of such water and unless pursuant to such application the time within which such 
nonuse may continue is extended by the state engineer as hereinafter provided. 
The provisions of this section are applicable whether such unused or abandoned 
water is permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right . 
[Emphasis added to the newly adopted language.] 
100-3 I Appropriation - Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be 
acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made 
and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the 
state engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. . . . No 
right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired 
by adverse use or adverse possession. [Emphasis added to the newly adopted 
language.] 
[RELEVANCE: Defendant's claimed period of adverse use is seven years beginning 
December 1, 1936 and continuing through November 30, 1943. The language added to 
the forfeiture provision (100-1-4) makes clear that use by an adverser is a nullity It 
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would not preclude the necessity of compliance with the requirement to obtain an 
extension in order to avoid the statutory forfeiture at the end of five years. The 
amendment to the appropriation provision (100-3-1) makes clear that a water right cannot 
be acquired by adverse use in any circumstance and that the prohibition applies both to 
appropriated and unappropriated water.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The water in question is collected in a remote area on the so-called Griffin Top 
above the 10,000 foot elevation in the Wasatch Mountains in east Garfield County. Left 
to its natural course, the water flows into the East Fork of the Sevier River and makes up 
a portion of the water supply for Plaintiffs and other users in the Counties of Garfield, 
Piute, Sevier, Sanpete, Juab, and Millard. During the late 1980's, Defendant engaged in 
some diversion and channeling work on the Griffin Top which was brought to the 
attention of the State Engineer who issued a cease, desist and restoration directive to 
Defendant. See Addendum /, TR 41. The work performed by Defendant was designed to 
carry the water out of the Sevier River Basin and into the Escalante River Drainage 
which is tributary to the Colorado River. During 1999, and instead of complying with 
the directive from the State Engineer, Defendant brought in earthmoving equipment 
creating a major channel with a berm that serves as a dike on the lower side. 
Both the channel and the dike are higher than a man's head. See Addendum 2, TR 76, 
and Addendum 5, TR 81. The extensive earthwork completed by Defendant prompted 
the filing of the instant lawsuit. 
1
 Defendant claims this was only "maintenance work" on a water way that had been in 
existence for over a hundred years. Plaintiffs consider this characterization a gross 
understatement about the earthwork and an overstatement about the pre-existing 
condition. This debate, however, is only germane if Defendant's legal theory prevails 
and a trial ensues. 
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In the court below, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment decreeing that 
Defendant had no right or entitlement to the water in question and further seeking an 
injunction against further diversion or use of the water, damages and an oi dei n lai idatii ig 
t h a i "v. : • : . ' ' J ' I ' *\<T-|:UCU, 1 I \ 1, l O - l / . 
Defendant counterclaimed advancing two causes of action. TR 178, 186. First it 
claimed a diligence right to water within the Sevier River System based on use prior to 
\{HI) nlirii nppln nl in mil In lilt" Slnlr hij'iticxi luaaiin lln >oli IIH Ihod Im .luiun iinij* a 
water right. During the course of the litigation, Defendant acknowledged that it had 
failed to file the statutorily required claim to these waters in the general adjudication 
which resulted in issuance of the so-called * ---Decree" on N IMJIIIIKI HI I 'MII iiiiiii 
d i s 111'' I « -11 J i I i • J , i 11 (n I i * 1,»i i i (i f'( \ s 11»111 i • i - -' - i t i noti on as to this claim holding that 
the decree adjudicated all of the waters of the "Sevier River System," that Defendant 's 
rights were properly determined in the action and that Defendant had forfeited all rights 
to llic usi of wain in in .m li s\ i J nun in I In M J H M I ' / W / I W / k a stuff Uiih ikitun I 6 7 , I K 91 )l( >-
111 I he decree relied on the statutory language that those failing to advance claims are 
"forever barred and estopped from subsequently asserting any rights and . . . [are] held 
to have forfeited all rights to use of said waters theretofore claimed. ' ' Sei * Chap 
6n S l T f l l M I "M> / . M I S .'/ / « ' / " IK'V". « ( l l l l t i n l ,ll * "' 'A ) "n" 4 - ^ 
Defendant's alternate theory of ownership of a water right in the Sevier Drainage 
is based on the doctrine of adverse use. It claims that one day after entry of the general 
adjudicate ; 
whom such waters had been decreed. Defendant claims this adverse use continued for a 
period of seven years from December 1, 1936 through November 30, 1943. 
Plaintiffs' deny both the claimed fact of usage as well as the quantity thereof 
during the period of time advanced. However, for the purpose of this appeal, and the 
testing of Defendant's legal theory, Plaintiffs agree that the court may assume that 
Defendant had the open, notorious and continuous adverse use of some of the water in 
question during the period from December 1, 1936 through November 30, 1943. 
The district court declined to grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
the adverse use claim, holding that use without right which continued after adverse use 
was outlawed in 1939 could still count toward the seven years required to vest title. 
Plaintiffs' appeal is taken from this ruling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
When the 1939 legislature put the final nails in the coffin of acquiring a water 
right based upon adverse user, it was not an isolated all-encompassing occurrence. 
Rather, it was the culmination of a struggle lasting over four decades; a struggle in which 
its design to end the dreaded scourge of one person stealing water which belongs to 
another was not always aided by the judiciary. 
During territorial times, acquisition of a water right by adverse use was recognized 
by statute. This changed the first year following statehood when the legislature dropped 
the provision recognizing such a right. This was reinforced six years later (1903) when it 
provided for appointment of a state engineer and adopted an application procedure as the 
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exclusive method for acquiring a water right. Also, in post statehood legislation, stealing 
water was treated for what it is a criminal offense. 
F : i at 01 it a qi lai t "i :)f a ce nti n ;; , tl le ad\ ei se i lse issue seems to 1 la * ' e beei i 
relatively quiet before uncertainty appeared in decisions of the supreme court. I his 
uncertainty reached its apex in 1937 - 1938 in two cases, the lead case being Hammond 
adverse use (erroneously analyzed as "adverse possession") as a legitimate method for 
acquiring a water right, and glorified the role of the adverser. When strong petitions for 
rehearing were filed pointing out the fallacies in the decision, the court pulled back but 
let the rest ill: stand • :: i l a thi • i e ill: > • :: • :: te. 
The 1939 legislature responded by closing all loopholes and eliminating all 
uncertainty that had found its way into the court decisions. The statutory changes were 
clear, concise and specifically directed to disallow what the court had appro\ ed Sine e 
another produces no right in the adverse user. 
On March 20, 1939 when the statutory changes outlawing all adverse use and 
I IliiiiiJiiiliiit! (in) In m In! MIMYIIOIII Ik i aim i l ln In c I k'li ml<mt' • 111 \ LIST II,1 I nil lln ". "iler 
in question had existed for only 28 of the 84 months required to vest title. Under the 
amended statutes, any use by Defendant after that date was a nullity. It was considered 
the same as If the "water ran to waste, Accordingly, Defendant gained no further 
,1!,! oi in in Il itntl (HI S() m o n t h s sin ml nil 11; i \ in*1 «,i \ r s l n l w • 1111 1'ijjjil li.is.nl u p o n . i t l u i s t " u s e 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Evolution of Utah Statutory and Case Law Reveals an Ongoing Effort 
by the Utah Legislature To Disallow Acquisition of a Water Right by Adverse Use. 
a. Introduction 
Beginning the year following statehood, the Utah legislature has charted a 
consistent course to eliminate acquisition of a water right by adverse use. The supreme 
court has been less consistent and to some extent may be seen as having impeded the 
process. 
In an earlier section of this brief, Plaintiffs have set forth the relevant statutory 
provisions beginning with the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah published in 1888 
and continuing through the statutory changes made by the legislature of 1939. Brief 
comments have been included reflecting the relevance of the statutory changes. The 
focus in this argument will be on the interplay between the decisions of the supreme 
court and the evolution of the statutory provisions. The case law will be quoted more 
extensively, with the statutory changes being quoted only to the extent required to clearly 
reflect the legislative response to court decisions. 
b. 1888-Territory of Utah 
The Complied Laws of Utah published in 1888 contained a provision that 
recognized the "vesting" of a primary water right "whenever any person or persons shall 
have had the open peaceable, uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period of 
seven years." § 2780. s 6. The territorial law further provided for forfeiture based on 
non-use for a period of seven years. § 2783. s 9. Case law applying § 2780 construed it 
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as establishing a right to obtain title by adverse use. See e.g., Ephraim Willow CreekIrr. 
Co., etal v. Olson, etai, 70 Utah 95, 100-101, 258 P. 216 (Utah 1927). However, "The 
presumption is against the acquisition of title by adverse use." Spring Creek Irr. Co. v. 
Zollinger, 58 Utah 90, 97, 187 P. 737 (Utah 1921). 
c. 1897 - 1898, Adverse Use Provision Dropped 
Statehood came to Utah in 1896. The 1897 legislature adopted new provisions 
relating to water. With respect to appropriation it provided: "The right to the use of any 
of the unappropriated waters of the state may be acquired by appropriation." SECTION 
1, CHAPTER LII. The adverse use provision was dropped. The seven year forfeiture for 
non-use was retained, Sec. 2, and a criminal offense was enacted for "any person who 
shall take or use more water than he is entitled to or has been allotted to him by a proper 
officer. . . ." Sec. 25. 
The territorial laws published in 1888 were superseded in their entirety by the 
publication of the Revised Statutes of the State of Utah 1898. As stated in the PREFACE, 
these were published pursuant to legislative authorization granted in Chapter 85 of the 
Laws of 1896 and had the effect of repealing all laws enacted prior to the second regular 
session of the legislature (1987) unless otherwise noted. The Revised Statutes did not 
include a provision for acquiring a water right by adverse use and such a provision never 
again appears in Utah statutory law. 
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d. 1903 - Appropriation by Application 
The 1903 legislature adopted "CHAPTER 100, Water Rights and Irrigation," 
which for the last one hundred plus years has been the basic law governing the 
acquisition of water rights in this state. It created the office of the State Engineer and 
charged him with the "general supervision of the waters of the State and of their 
measurement, apportionment and appropriation." SECTION ONE. The act went on to 
provide: "Sec. 34. Rights to Unappropriated Water. Rights to the use of any of the 
unappropriated water in the State may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner 
hereafter provided, and not otherwise." The phrase "manner hereinafter provided" was 
the lead-in to Section 35 which required that an application to appropriate be filed with 
the State Engineer before an appropriation was undertaken. The 1903 act further retained 
the provision for forfeiture based on seven years of non-use. Sec. 50. 
e. 1919 - General Adjudication; Five-Year Forfeiture 
In 1919, the legislature reenacted the basic appropriation statute of 1903, created 
the basic structure of a general adjudication, which essentially remains in force today, 
and reduced the period for forfeiture based on non-use from seven years to five years. 
See Sec. 6 Chapter 67. The change from seven years to five years did not become a focus 
until years later and will be discussed infra. 
f. 1925 - Uncertainty Appears 
The subject of whether adverse use survived the 1903 appropriation statute and its 
reenactment in 1919 appears to have first surfaced in Deseret Livestock Co, v. 
Hooppianna, et al., 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479 (Utah 1925). The Deseret case evidences 
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either lingering or newly advanced judicial doubt as to whether the appropriation statute 
of 1903 as recodified in 1919 had forever extinguished a claim based on adverse use. A 
majority of the court was certain that it had. "We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the 
legislature of Utah, by the act of 1903, intended to limit the method of acquiring any right 
to the unappropriated public waters of the state to the method or means prescribed in that 
act." 66 Utah at 38. A concurring opinion added: "The very language and purpose of 
the act, when construed in connection with the acts which it superseded and repealed, 
demonstrates conclusively that the purpose was to provide an exclusive method of 
appropriating water and securing a record title thereto." Id. at 39. The two dissenters did 
not agree and took some forty-four pages examining the law from all of the surrounding 
states. Id. 39-82. They sought to make the case that a water right need not be based upon 
application, but could become vested by "actual diversion of waters and applying them to 
beneficial use. . . . There is no better evidence of possessing anything than by seizing 
and taking it." 66 Utah at 48. The dissents prompted considerable frustration of the 
majority as is apparent in the concurring opinion of Justice Thurmond: 
The question is, if the legislature of the State of Utah had the power to 
enact an exclusive method of initiating an appropriation of water, and 
procuring the title thereto, what else could it have done or what more could 
it have said than has been done and said through all this course of 
legislation down to the present time? If plain, emphatic unequivocal 
language is not sufficient to express the intention of the legislature, in what 
manner and by what means can the legislature express its intention? 
Id. 42-43. 
Seven years after the Deseret decision, the court decided Clark, et al v. North 
Cottonwood Irrigation and Water Co. of Farmington, 11 P.2d 300 (Utah 1932). In the 
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meantime, the composition of the court had changed. Three new justices had been 
appointed. Of the two who remained, one had concurred and one had dissented in 
Deseret. The court decided to sidestep the issue: 
It may be a debatable question whether title to a water right may be 
acquired since the enactment of Laws of Utah, 1903, Chap. 100, by 
adverse use or after it has been abandoned by a prior appropriator without 
a filing in the office of the State Engineer as provided by law. . . . [citing 
Deseret], This case does not require a decision of that question, and we do 
not express any opinion concerning the same. 
11 P.2d at 304-305. 
g. 1935 - Strengthening the Statute 
The 1935 legislature amended both the forfeiture provision and the provision 
governing appropriation. Under Section 100-1-4, an appropriator could avoid the 
automatic forfeiture after five years of non-use only by timely filing "with the State 
Engineer a verified application for an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within 
which to resume the use of such water" or to apply for an additional extension. Failure to 
timely file the request resulted in the forfeiture. The appropriation provision was 
amended to read as follows: 
100-3-1. Only Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state 
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water 
may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of 
intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application for such 
appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise. . . . [Emphasis added to the new language 
adopted.] 
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Prior to the amendment, the statute had read: "Rights to the use of the 
unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired by appropriation in the 
manner hereinafter provided and not otherwise'' (Emphasis added.) The application 
process was set forth in a separate section. The dissents in Deseret had expressed the 
view that the majority was placing undue emphasis on the words "and not otherwise" and 
that they should be viewed in the context of the whole statute rather than being tied 
exclusively to the process of acquiring a water right by filing an application with the 
State Engineer. See, e.g., discussion 66 Utah at 79-82. The 1935 amendment brought the 
provisions together in the same section, thus making clear the legislative intent to connect 
the "not otherwise" language with the "application" process. 
h. 1937-38, Turning the Law Upside Down 
In 1937, the supreme court handed down two decisions that temporarily derailed 
the legislative effort to end rewarding water thievery. Rather than condemn such, the 
court legitimatized the dreaded practice of stealing water and raised it almost to an 
honored station foreign to a civilized society. Finding no support in the water code, the 
court turned to the law of adverse possession relating to land, citing 104-2-9 to 104-2-12, 
inclusive, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. It held that rights to the use of public water 
could be obtained by "disseisin of the owner" under the statutory provisions of adverse 
possession. These sections simply don't fit. The court disregarded fundamental 
differences between land which has a fixed situs and water that is in perpetual motion. It 
indirectly invited a fight on the ditch bank and offered a glorified view of an adverse 
possessor: 
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He enters as a conquistador, bent upon acquiring that which another 
possessed, not necessarily vi et armis, by killing or physically ejecting the 
owner, but by the process of assuming and exercising the rights and 
prerogatives of the owner, without his consent and in defiance of the 
owner's will. He plants his flag, his standard, as it were, upon the property 
as notice to the owner and all the world that he has taken possession, and 
henceforth will govern and control it; that the property henceforth has a 
new owner and that he proposes to maintain that title and possession 
against all. 
From Attila, the Hun, down through the colonial expansions of the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries to the present, the right of one with 
sufficient nerve and courage to extend his dominions by the simple process 
of taking possession has been recognized, subject only to growing and 
more definite and refined methods and requirements of manifesting the 
possession and the intention to take and hold. 
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894, 900 (Utah 1937). The second decision, Adams v. 
Portage Irrigation Reservoir and Power Co,, 72 P.2d 648 (Utah 1937), issued later in the 
year, relied upon Hammond and did not alter the debate. 
The full thrust of these decisions was short lived. Each prompted strong petitions 
for rehearing not only by the losing party but by the State Engineer who argued that the 
rights of the public had been wholly disregarded. While the rehearing petitions were 
denied; each resulted in a written opinion which was much more subdued, and limited. 
Moreover, the votes which had been unanimous were now three-two. The Hammond 
majority treated the prior opinion as settling only a private dispute between two users at 
the end of a ditch and not "effecting] any right which the state or any other person, not a 
party or claiming under a party, had or could assert in or to the waters in question." 
Hammond, rehearing denied, 75 P.2d 164, 166 (Utah 1939). Adams is in accord, 
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rehearing denied, 81 P.2d 368 (Utah 1938). The dissenters wanted to grant rehearings 
"in order that we may determine whether title to a water right may be obtained against 
anyone by adverse possession." Hammond, 75 P.2d at 167. As a result of the initial 
decisions and the partial withdrawals, the whole doctrine of adverse use of water was 
thrown into a state of uncertainty and disarray. 
i. Hammond Could Not be Disregarded 
Notwithstanding the back peddling by the court, Hammond had made two points 
which could not be disregarded and required legislative clarification. With respect to the 
appropriation provision, 100-3-1, and the application provision, 100-3-2, Hammond had 
stated: 
It is clear from the language that the sections above quoted apply only to 
acquiring rights in the unappropriated public water and have no reference 
to water rights which have passed to private ownership until they have 
been abandoned and thereby reverted to the public. 
[Emphasis by the court.] Since most of the public's water had been appropriated by 
1937, the distinction drawn by the court, when coupled with the second point discussed 
below, would have rendered the appropriation statute of 1903 almost meaningless. 
The second substantive, but misguided, point from Hammond was to the effect 
that so long as previously appropriated water was being used by a private claimant, it 
didn't matter who it was or how he/she came by it. The appropriator in Hammond had 
openly accused the adverser of "stealing" his water. The court was oblivious to the 
wrong, but relied upon the stealing accusation as evidence that the appropriator had not 
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abandoned the water; concluding thereby that it could not have reverted to the public. 66 
P.2dat90L Hammond's reasoning appears in this excerpt: 
As long as water, which has passed to private hands, is put to a beneficial 
use, the state has no vital interest as to who the user is. That is, as long as 
the use granted and recognized by the state is exercised, the state has no 
interest in what may be the name of the person who exercises it. It 
follows, therefore, that notwithstanding the statute of appropriation, as 
between private claimants, water rights in Utah can be acquired by adverse 
user and possession. 
66 P.2d at 900-901.2 
j . 1939 - Permanently Closing the Door on Adverse Use 
The foregoing set the stage for the 1939 legislature. Its assignment was clear. It 
needed to settle the uncertainty expressed by the court in Deseret (1925) and Clark 
(1932). It also had to definitively refute or let stand the bold assertions of the Hammond 
court as to the two points last discussed. Finally, if there were a deficiency in its prior 
language, that had to be cured. The '39 amendments were simple, straightforward and 
definitive. The appropriation statute was amended to read as follows: 
100-3-1. Appropriation - Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state 
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water 
may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of 
intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application for such 
appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the manner hereinafter 
Hammond appears confused about the statutory forfeiture period that controlled. The 
court quotes from the Revised Statutes of1933, which had incorporated the 1919 change 
from seven to five years, but went on to state that the compiled laws of 1917 (seven years) 
governed even though the claimed period of use was from February 1925 to October 
1934. No explanation is given for this apparent misstatement. 66 P.2d at 899, 901. It 
becomes a non issue here because Hammond went on to hold that it didn't matter who 
used the water (appropriator or adverser) so long as it was not allowed to run to waste. 
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provided, and not otherwise. . . . No right to the use of water either 
appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or 
adverse possession. [Emphasis added to the newly adopted language.] 
Thus the Hammond court's distinction between appropriated and unappropriated'water 
was rendered meaningless. Further, the Hammond court's assertion that "water rights in 
Utah can be acquired by adverse user and possession," 66 P.2d at 900-901, was flatly 
rejected. The uncertainty in Deseret and Clark were eliminated. 
The forfeiture provision was amended to read as follows; 
100-1-4. Reversion to Public by Abandonment or Failure to Use 
Within 5 Years - Extending Time. 
When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or 
cease to use water for a period of five years the right shall cease, and 
thereupon such water shall revert to the public, and may be again 
appropriated as provided in this title, unless before the expiration of such 
five-year period the appropriator or his successor in interest shall have 
filed with the state engineer a verified application for an extension of time, 
not to exceed five years, within which to resume the use of such water and 
unless pursuant to such application the time within which such nonuse may 
continue is extended by the state engineer as hereinafter provided. The 
provisions of this section are applicable whether such unused or 
abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by others without 
right. . . . [Emphasis added to the newly adopted language.] 
The assumption by the Hammond court that the identity of the user and the legitimacy of 
the use was of no interest to the state proved to be false. Use without right was a nullity. 
The adverser got nothing. Forfeiture was not stayed. It was as though the water ran to 
waste. Moreover, as a result of the 1935 amendment, not discussed by Hammond, the 
only way to avoid forfeiture at the end of five years was for the "appropriator or his 
successor" to apply for an extension. This provision likewise applied if the water ran to 
waste or was being used by an adverser. 
r\ 
k. Finality Achieved 
The foregoing brought the statutory evolution to an end and provided finality. 
When Senate Bill No. 234 (see the '39 session laws attached as part of Addendum 5) 
passed the legislature on March 7, 1939 and became effective on March 20 of that year, 
any benefit associated with the taking of water belonging to somebody else was at an 
end. It seems apparent that the legislature thought it was dead long before, but as of that 
date, it clearly became a closed chapter in the history of Utah water law. The very nature 
of the '39 amendments precludes an argument that unlawful use thereafter could 
somehow mature into a vested right or could qualify to prevent statutory forfeiture. 
II. With One Exception, Post-1939 Supreme Court Decisions Support the 
Proposition that Acquisition of a Water Right by Adverse User Ended in 1939. 
There are only a handful of post-1939 cases that need to be examined. Each will 
be addressed. 
a. Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsey Land & Livestock, 130 P.2d 634, 
(Utah 1943). Wellsville is by far the most important post-1939 decision. While its 
historical analysis is more abbreviated than the foregoing, it essentially follows the same 
path in tracing the development of Utah water law from 1888 through the statutory 
changes of 1939. The claimed adverse use in Wellsville had commenced in 1922. Id, at 
637. Hence the assigned task of the Wellsville court was to deal with the uncertainty 
between 1903 and 1939. The court describes the manner in which the stage was set after 
denial of the petitions for rehearings in Hammond and Adams, and what was left for the 
court to decide following the legislative amendments: 
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Both of the denials of petitions for rehearing were by 3-2 decisions. The 
dissenting justices felt that the whole question of adverse user in relation to 
water rights should have been reopened and not left in its existing state of 
uncertainty. Subsequently at the 1939 session, see Laws of Utah 1939, Ch. 
I l l , the legislature adopted amendments designed to prevent the 
acquisition of a right to water already appropriated by another, solely by 
adverse user. Thus the question as to whether title could be acquired by 
adverse user during that period between 1903 and 1939 is still left in a 
state of uncertainty. 
Id. at 639 (emphasis added). 
The Wellsville court proceeded to examine the two year disparity between the five 
year forfeiture provision and the seven year adverse user requirement. The court 
recognized that the only way to protect the adverse user's claim during the two year 
hiatus was to allow use by the adverser to keep the appropriation alive and prevent 
forfeiture to the public. The court, however, also recognized that this could not extend 
beyond the legislative amendments of 1939: 
Therefore if we were to hold that non-use resulting from an unlawful 
diversion by another would work a statutory forfeiture, we logically would 
be compelled to hold that title could not be acquired by adverse possession. 
The converse of this is also true; that is, if title can be acquired by adverse 
use, then title does not revert to the public after five or more years of 
adverse use. This would be the result of such a holding as to a right 
vesting prior to 1939 when Section 100-1-4 [forfeiture] was amended to 
read that "the provisions of this section are applicable whether such 
unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by 
others without right." 
Wellsville at 639 (emphasis added). 
The district judge below appears to have simply overlooked the 1939 amendment 
to the forfeiture statute. He makes no reference to it nor to the concept that "use without 
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right" is treated the same as allowing the water to run to waste. Here is what the lower 
court said beginning at page 11, Memo. Dec, Addendum 4, TR 914-15. 
It is clear from the Wellsville case that an adverse possessor acquires 
some type of right as against everyone else (except the true owner) even if 
an adverse possessor is still in the process of satisfying the statutory 
period. This pronouncement was made in the context of discussing the 
interplay between the five-year forfeiture statute and the seven-year 
adverse possession statute. The Wellsville court said the following: 
However, we held that as between the prior owner and the 
adverser, the adverser could after seven years of open, notorious 
etc., possession, have his title quieted as against the prior owner. 
Hence, we must have held that the adverser got something. If after 
five years of nonuse title reverted to the public, neither the adverser 
nor the prior owner would have any title. At 638-9. (Emphasis 
added by the lower court.) 
Neither the logic nor the conclusion of the lower court seem consistent with the 
language quoted and its context. Wellsville was not talking about the case before it nor 
about the state of the law after the 1939 amendments. It is a commentary on the dilemma 
created by the Hammond decision. The gist of the Wellsville predicament growing out of 
Hammond is that the court had been "painted into a corner." Wellsville could not 
disregard the fact that in Hammond, the adversers title had been quieted against the prior 
owner. Hence "the adverser got something," even though on rehearing the court 
"purported to leave open the question as to whether or not title had reverted to the 
public." At 638. The Hammond court's effort to narrow the holding from the first 
opinion created a non sequitor. Hammond could not quiet title in the adverser and leave 
the issue of adverse use open at the same time. Unable to reconcile the inconsistency, 
Wellsville put on its pragmatic hat. It noted the uncertainty and potential detrimental 
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reliance introduced by the court, and reached a practical result with fixed time 
parameters. 
The case of Hammond v. Johnson, supra, held that the forfeiture statutes 
prior to 1939 did not apply to a case where the failure to use was the result 
of an unlawful diversion by another, and that title can, therefore, be 
acquired by adverse user. We think that this attains a desirable result and 
conclude that title could between 1903 and 1939 be acquired by adverse 
possession. (Emphasis added). 
There is an absence of any discussion in Wellsville that supports application of Hammond 
beyond 1939, or any basis for arguing that the adverser could have been treated the same 
after the '39 amendments. The cutoff is clearly fixed as of 1939 because after that use by 
the adverser is the same as though the "water is permitted to run to waste." 100-1-4. 
b. Smith v. Sanders, 189 P.2d 201 (Utah 1948). 
In Smith, the defendant Sanders had failed to establish a valid appropriation or 
seven years of adverse use. In commenting on the failure of proof, the court revealed its 
view of the impact of the 1939 legislation: 
Unless there had been a valid appropriation of the water no one could 
obtain any rights to it by adverse user even under our decisions in 
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894, and Wellsville East Field 
Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 
634, which held the right to the use of appropriated water could be 
obtained by adverse possession before our legislature in Session Laws of 
Utah 1939, Ch. I l l , amendedSec. 100-3-1, R.S.U. 1933, and prohibited 
the acquiring of the right to the use of either appropriated or 
unappropriated waters by adverse possession. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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c. Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 265 P.2d 1016 (Utah 
1954). Mitchell is an innocent decision that has subsequently been cited for something 
for which it does not stand. The whole of relevant language from Mitchell is as follows: 
Plaintiffs claim to the waters in question is based on adverse user from 
1899 to 1939; since which date the initiation of water rights by this method 
has been precluded by statute. 
Id. at 1019 (emphasis added). The language in context is relatively benign. It does not 
purport to address use which overlapped the statutory changes of 1939. The language is 
correct in its application to the facts before the court which concerned use that predated 
1939. However, by use of the word "initiation" the court appears to have inadvertently 
invited an argument advanced years later and embraced by the district court below. The 
Mitchell dicta is extremely weak for all that has been attributed to it. 
d. In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 361 P.2d 406 (Utah 1961). 
One of the water claimants governed by the 1919 general adjudication of the Bear River 
subsequently claimed a greater quantity by adverse use which continued after the decree. 
The court identified the outer limits of an advance use claim after the '39 amendments. 
Proof of water by adverse use is difficult. Our territorial statutes recognize 
such a right as did our judicial decisions after statehood until made 
ineffective thereafter by the 1939 legislature. So appellants could acquire 
water rights by adverse use only by continuous adverse use for seven years 
after the 1919 decree and before the 1939 statute. 
361 P.2d at 410 (emphasis added). Because there were twenty years between the Bear 
River decree and the statutory changes, the court did not need to directly confront the 
issue of adverse use which overlapped 1939, but its language is clear, direct and on point. 
It led the authors of Br igham Young University Legal Studies, J. Rueben Clark Law 
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School, to conclude that "any possible claims of a right arising by adverse use must have 
matured before the 1939 amendment to the code." Summary of Utah Real Property Law, 
1978, Volume II, Chapter XIV, Water Law, § 14:32, page 628 (emphasis added) (See 
Addendum 6). 
e. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 Utah 3, 5 P.3d, 1206. 
We come at last to the Silver Fork Pipeline case which contains contrary dicta on which 
Defendant relies. The adverse use claim in Silver Fork Pipeline commenced during the 
early 1940's after a ditch was authorized and excavated across Forest Service land. 
There was no use which preceded the 1939 statutory changes. Id. at 1220-22. The 
adverse use claim was rejected for this reason. In this context, the court included 
footnote number 19 which reads: 
Before 1939, Utah law allowed a party to obtain title to use of water by 
adverse possession. See Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 28, 66 P.2d 
894, 900-01 (1937). Following an amendment to Utah's Water Code in 
1939, adverse use that began before 1939 could still ripen into title after 
the effective date of the Act. See Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. 
Co., 1 Utah 2d 313, 317, 265 P.2d 1036, 1019 (1954); Wellsville East Field 
Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 460-66, 137 P.2d 
634, 640 (1943). However, adverse use commenced after the effective 
date of the act could not ripen into title by adverse possession: "[N]o right 
to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired 
by adverse use or adverse possession." 1939 Utah Laws ch. 111, § 1. 
The district court below acknowledged that the language from Silver Fork 
Pipeline was dicta, but expressed the view that it may be helpful in predicting how the 
supreme court would rule on the issue at hand. Memo. Dec, Addendum 4 at 12, TR 915. 
Such would likely be true if the court's footnote evidenced both a careful analysis and a 
solid legal foundation. It evidences neither. The facts of Silver Fork Pipeline did not call 
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for a careful analysis of the "overlap" issue since the claimed use began during the early 
1940's well after the '39 statutory changes were in force. The legal foundation is limited 
to Mitchell and Wellsville. These cases have been extensively discussed above. Each 
supports the result reached in Silver Fork Pipeline (no adverse use after 1939), but 
neither supports the position that the effective date of the '39 amendments could be 
delayed to protect an adverser whose water right was not vested. Wellsville is quite 
clearly to the contrary, as is the Bear River decision. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the benign use of the word "initiation" in 
Mitchell is a woefully inadequate foundation for disregarding what appears to be a four-
decade effort by the legislature, culminating in 1939, to put an end to rewarding those 
who steal water. Moreover, and more importantly, the clear language of the statute will 
not allow credit for "use without right" after March 20, 1939. Plaintiffs are unaware of 
any basis by which this court could decline to apply the statutory changes adopted. The 
language from Silver Fork Pipeline should be treated for what it was - a footnote that 
went beyond what the facts of the case required. There should be no reluctance to 
decline to rely on dicta when it contradicts what the legislature has so clearly provided. 
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 Troubled by the footnote from Silver Fork Pipeline and the absence of support in 
Mitchell or Wellsville on which it is bottomed, I have earnestly attempted to find some 
explanation for what appears to be an erroneous statement of the law. In this effort I 
have examined articles by well-known experts on Utah or western states water law. They 
include works by Wells A. Hutchings, Richard L. Dewsnup, Dallin W. Jensen and Robert 
W. Swenson. Excerpts from these publications are attached hereto as Addendum 6. With 
one exception, there is no support in any of these for the Silver Fork Pipeline language. 
The exception is a "passing" comment in A Primer of Utah Water Law by Robert W. 
Swenson, former professor of law at the University of Utah. It may have spawned the 
Silver Fork Pipeline footnote and the reliance on the Mitchell case as authority. The 
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III. The Plain Meaning of the Statutes and Their History Preclude the 
Adverse Use Claim Advanced by Defendant 
a. The Plain Language and History of the Statute are Consistent. 
"This court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent." Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996); Smith v. Price 
Development Co., 2005 UT 87 f 16. "The legislature's intent is manifested by the 
language it employed." Id. citing Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106 % 18. 
Normally a court would not look to legislative history unless the statutory provisions are 
ambiguous. See id. citing Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, If 8. In this case, Plaintiffs 
have laid out the legislative history because they perceive a greater challenge arising 
from the contrary dicta in Silver Fork Pipeline. That dicta should be given no deference, 
first for the reason that unlike the instant case the Silver Fork Pipeline facts do not 
overlap the 1939 statutory changes, and second on the basis that its dicta runs counter to 
supreme court would have been aware of the Swenson article because it was quoted on 
another topic in Provo River Water User's Ass 'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927 (Utah 1993), 
which decision was quoted and discussed at some length in Silver Fork Pipeline. The 
reader is invited to closely examine the abbreviated treatment given by Professor 
Swenson to the adverse user subject. In an article well in excess of 100 pages, he devotes 
less than a page and one-half to this topic. Moreover, the commentary is not 
complimentary of the supreme court's handling of adverse user cases. Swenson finds 
little to appreciate in the deference paid Attila the Hun, Swenson at 189, and notes the 
anomaly of acquisition of a water right before 1939 based on seven-years adverse use 
when it took twenty years to obtain a prescriptive easement for an irrigation ditch, id. at 
191. In passing, and without analysis, he makes a one sentence comment about the 1939 
amendment and states that the supreme court "later indicated that adverse use which had 
commenced prior to 1939 could ripen into title after the effective date of the act." Id. at 
190. The sole and only authority cited in support of this attribution to the supreme court 
is the Mitchell case. Hence, it appears that the whole of the foundation for the out-of-
harmony dicta from Silver Fork Pipeline may be one word - "initiation" - perhaps 
improvidently and likely innocently used in the Mitchell decision. 
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a clear and extensive legislative history that conclusively demonstrates that the 
legislature intended exactly what it stated in the '39 amendments. 
b. There is no Basis to Decline Enforcement of the 1939 
Statutory Amendments. 
It is universally understood that the legislature has the power to adopt measures 
thought to be in the best interests of the people unless those measures are violative of 
constitutional principles. Both the Utah and United States Constitutions contain a 
prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 22. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment, made 
applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. Price Development, f 
11, citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). 
The lower court engaged in a discussion about whether the '39 amendments were 
retroactive because they precluded Defendant from completing the seven years necessary 
to vest title by adverse use. Memo. Dec. at 9, TR 912. The implication is that there has 
been a "taking" - that the legislature took away an entitlement belonging to Defendant. 
To the contrary, the legislature simply drew a line after which the unauthorized use of 
water belonging to someone else produced no benefit for the adverser. This is a clear 
justified public policy decision, only "actionable" if Defendant were deprived of "a 
protectable property interest." Smith, ^ 12, citing Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 
1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). To be protectable, the interest must be "vested." Id. ^  14, 
relying on the seminal case of McCulloughv. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 1234(1898). Like 
the claimant in McCullough, Smiths had obtained a judgment in the trial court. "The first 
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step in our analysis is therefore to determine whether the Smiths had a vested interest in 
the disputed portion of the . . . judgment." Smith ^ 15. (Emphasis by the court.) 
In determining whether the property interest had vested, the Smith court turned to 
the case of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65 f 12 n. 3 for a definition. Banks adopted a 
definition from Black's Law Dictionary, 1557 (7th ed. 1999): "A 'vested' interest is 
something '[t]hat has become a completed, consummated right for present or future 
enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute . . . . ' " 
The supreme court engaged in a similar inquiry in Utah Public Employees 
Association v. State, 2006 UT 9. In that case public employees claimed that HB 213 
adopted by the 2005 legislature resulted in an unconstitutional taking of "vested personal 
property to which they have a contractual right." Id. ^ 27. The court disagreed 
concluding: "Plaintiff s lack vested contract rights." Id. [Emphasis added.] "Both 
parties agree that a public employee obtains vested rights to retirement benefits 'only 
when he has satisfied all conditions precedent.'" (Citation to footnote omitted). "We 
agree that parties must satisfy all conditions precedent before the rights vest." Id. f 29. 
The court below declined to apply the Utah Public Employees Association case 
because it involved contract rights and the case before this case does not. Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the question does not center upon whether the claimed property 
interest is of a particular type. Generally speaking, both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions 
protect all types of private property, tangible or intangible. Bagfordv. Ephraim, 904 
P.2d at 1098, headnote 3-5. The relevant inquiry is not the type of property, but whether 
the claimant has a "vested protectable property interest." In the absence of such, the 
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legislature is free to act. a[A] mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits" 
is not enough. See id. at 1099, citations omitted. 
c. Defendant's Claim Fails Because Under the Clear Language of the Statute it 
Lacked a Vested Protectable Property Interest. 
The amendment to the appropriation provision (100-3-1) effective March 20, 
1939 provided: "No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can 
be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession." At that time, Defendant was 56 
months short of having a vested water right. If Defendant somehow escaped this clear 
prohibition, the next insurmountable hurdle was the forfeiture provision which returned 
the water to the public after November 30, 1941, that being five years from the alleged 
shift of use from Plaintiffs to Defendant. Bridging the gap between the forfeiture and the 
additional two years required to vest a water right by adverse use would have been 
impossible since no request for an extension had been filed "by the appropriator or his 
successor," as required by the statute. § 100-1-4. 
This requirement had been in force since the adoption of the Session Laws of 
1935. From the inception of the claimed adverse use, all parties were on notice of the 
deadline and that in the absence of an extension request the forfeiture could not be 
stayed. The date passed without an extension request being filed. Under Defendant's 
version of the facts, forfeiture to the public would have been inevitable. Moreover, 
Defendant would have been powerless to alter the outcome because as of the forfeiture 
date, the 1939 Amendments had been in force for over two and one-half years and 
Defendant's continuing "use without right" counted for no more than if the water were 
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"permitted to run to waste."4 Section 100-1-4, Laws of 1939, {See the relevant text at 
page 9 supra and the full text in Addendum 5 under 1939 Session Laws.) 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the dicta from Silver Fork Pipeline can not 
survive a direct confrontation with the clear language adopted by the 1939 legislature. 
IV. Even if Legally Possible, the Equities Do Not Favor Refusal 
to Enforce the 1939 Legislative Acts, 
The decision of the district court elevates the process of acquiring a water right by 
adverse user to an undeserved status. The court states that between 1936 and 1939, "the 
Defendant was in the process of acquiring a water right by adverse possession [use]." 
Memo. Dec. at 9, TR 912. The court then reasons, "If the [1939] statute prohibited the 
Defendant from completing the acquisition it would be tantamount to imposing an 
additional burden on the Defendant and would be retroactive in that sense." Id. It is as 
though the Defendant were an applicant carefully following the statutory appropriation 
procedure and was wronged when this legitimate process was cut short. 
In truth, there was nothingTegitimate about what Defendant was doing. Defendant 
was acting in direct violation of the Cox Decree and the applicable statute which 
provided that the consequence of failing to participate in the general adjudication was 
that the claimant was "forever barred from asserting its claim." Moreover the claimed 
Plaintiffs are careful to point out that they accept Defendant's version only for purposes 
of this appeal. It is their view that forfeiture would not have arisen because the waters in 
question continued to flow into the East Fork of the Sevier River and any flow into the 
Colorado River Drainage would have been de minimis prior to the earthwork in the late 
eighties, discovered and brought to the attention of the State Engineer in 1991, and the 
much more extensive earthwork clandestinely done in 1999. 
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conduct would constitute a criminal offense under Section 25, Chapter LII, adopted by 
the 1897 legislature one year after statehood. Similarly it would violate § 62, Session 
Laws of1919, which had empowered the State Engineer to appoint water commissioners 
and to carry out the judgments of the courts in relation to the division, distribution or use 
of water and with power to arrest anyone found in violation and turn such person over to 
the sheriff, § 67. Id. Finally, under Section 103-59-1, Revised Statutes of 1933, it was a 
criminal offense to interfere with the flow of water in any stream under the management 
of any water commissioner.5 
In short, after the '39 amendments, the conduct which Defendant claims it 
engaged in would not have been acceptable. By then it was patently clear that any 
benefit from stealing water was at an end and that the antics of Attila the Hun were not 
permitted under Utah water law, the language in Hammond to the contrary 
notwithstanding.6 A more tempered and enlightened view was expressed by District 
Judge Hoyt who sat with the supreme court in the Wellsville case. Concurring in part and 
5
 Plaintiffs do not accuse Defendant of these offenses because they are not persuaded that 
Defendant actually engaged in any diversion or use of the water from December 1, 1936 
through November 30, 1943. For purposes of this appeal, they do not challenge 
Defendant's claim, but if true then such constitutes an admission that the various statutes 
were immediately violated after entry of the general adjudication decree. 
6
 Attila the Hun was not a good choice for a "role model." Between A.D. 434 and his 
death in 453, Attila ravaged, murdered and plundered throughout much of the Eastern 
and Western Empires of the time. Known as the "scourge of God" for his savagery, he 
said of himself: "Where I have passed, the grass will not grow again." Tyrants, 
History's 100 Most Evil Despots and Dictators, Nigel Cawthorne, 2005 by Arcturus 
Publishing Limited, 2006 edition by Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., page 30. See 
Addendum 7. 
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dissenting in part, he recognized the practical realities behind the appropriation statute 
adopted in 1903 and the grave danger from continuing to reward those who steal water. 
If we recognize the right of an adverser to acquire title by larceny or 
wrongful taking of water for a period of seven years, we have given 
judicial sanction to a practice which has resulted in innumerable 
controversies, much costly litigation and some deaths. 
Wellsville, 137 P.2d at 655. It may be revealing that Wellsville was handed down on May 
14, 1943. Some of the deaths stemming from stealing water may have been fresh in the 
minds of the justices.7 
CONCLUSION 
This court should hold that after March 20, 1939, when the statutory amendments 
became effective, adverse use of water belonging to another produced no right or benefit 
for the adverser. Such use could not count toward the seven years necessary to "vest" an 
At least two deaths during this time frame resulted from fights over the waters of Sevier 
River tributaries in the Counties of Piute and Sevier. On the morning of June 21, 1941, 
near the mouth of Dry Canyon on the east side of the Sevier River some eight miles south 
of Marysvale in Piute County, 19 year old Chad Howes was shot and killed by Walter 
Nielsen after a fight broke out over Nielsen's water. Nielsen was tried and acquitted in a 
celebrated case in which a young Calvin Rampton (later Governor Rampton), acting as a 
deputy attorney general, prosecuted the action for the state. A History of Piute County, 
Linda King Newell, Utah State Historical Society 1999. See Addendum 8. The second 
death stemmed from a fight over water which occurred near Koosharem Reservoir in 
Sevier County on August 11, 1941. See Grass Valley History, Addendum 8. Charles 
Erwin Burr had overpowered W.A. "Boss" Lipsey and according to the Information filed 
in the Sixth District Court, Burr "maliciously, with his bare hands, dug and put out the 
left eye of one W.A. Lipsey." Burr was tried to a jury and acquitted on a charge of 
mayhem on June 6, 1942. Criminal Number 3636, Sixth District Court for Sevier 
County. See Court Records, Addendum 8. Apparently the acquittal was too much for 
Lispey who had lost the eye. On the 23rd day of March, 1943, he ambushed, shot and 
killed Burr as the latter came riding by on his horse. See Grass Valley History, 
Addendum 8. Lipsey was convicted and sent to prison. Criminal Number 3746, Sixth 
District Court for Sevier County. See Court Records, Addendum 8. 
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adverse use right, nor could it prevent forfeiture of the water right to the public. Simply 
stated, adverse use, after the '39 amendments was treated the same as if the water were 
permitted to run to waste. 
This holding should be based upon the dual foundation of (1) the plain meaning of 
the 1939 amendment of § 100-1-4 and § 100-3-1 of the water code then in force, and (2) 
the history of the evolution of the water code and the relationships between it and the 
decisions of the supreme court between the 1888 Laws of the Territory of Utah and the 
1939 statutory amendments. This dual foundation is warranted in demonstrating that the 
contrary dicta in Silver Fork Pipeline is not the product of, nor can it withstand a full 
and complete analysis in light of the history which led to the 1939 statutory amendments 
and the plain language which the legislature adopted in ending any reward or benefit in 
favor of someone using water belonging to someone else. 
The court should enter an order reversing the district court's refusal to enter 
summary judgment dismissing Defendant's adverse use cteim, and direct the court to 
enter judgment, 
1. Decreeing that Defendant has no interest in the waters in question and that 
they remain subject to the general adjudication decree of the Sevier River entered on 
November 30, 1936, 
2. Enjoining and restraining Defendant from any further diversion or use of 
the waters in question, 
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3. Ordering Defendant to submit an engineering plan for reversal of the 
excavation and earthwork and for restoring the natural geography and revegetating the 
surface, 
4. Reserving jurisdiction until the plan for restoration and revegetation has 
been fully carried out to the satisfaction of the state engineer and the court, and 
5. Awarding Plaintiffs damages sustained by them, together with costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I / ^ a y of April, 2007. 
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State Engineer Cease, Desist and Restoration Directive 
2*>^5f | DEPA... MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
^ W * DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
Norman M Banflcrtor i „ ..
 A fl Southern Area (Jmrrnnr i l 
,% „ ., k 130 North Main Slreet 
DcoC Hanson P 
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November 22, 1991 
New Escalante Irrigation Company 
c/o Clayne Coleman 
Escalante, Utah 84726 
Dear Mr. Coleman: 
It has been brought to the attention of the State Engineer of a spring diversion 
originating in Section 1, T33S, R1W, SLB&M. This diversion consists of an 
earthen canal that intercepts Iron Spring and other water sources that are 
tributary to the South Fork of the Sevier River. The canal conveys this water 
approximately two miles to a point where it becomes tributary to North Creek. 
Upon investigation, by the State Engineers office, it has been determined that 
there is not a water right of record for this diversion. Therefore, the 
diversion and use of this water is in violation of Section 73-3-1 Utah Code 
Annotated, which states that no appropriation of water may be made and no rights 
to the use thereof initiated shall be recognized except application for such 
appropriation first be made to the State Engineer. 
I am requesting that as soon as possible, which may not be until the summer of 
1992, the canal be backfilled and revegetated to discontinue the conveyance of 
water. 
Should you wish to meet with me concerning this matter to discuss these items, 
I would be happy to do so. 
Your earliest response would be appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Kirk Forbush, P.E. ( 
Regional Engineer 
KF/C1W .-'.! « - $9'» 
cc: Lee Sim, Directing Distr ibution Engineer -;:-: r. -
Gerald Stoker, Regional Engineer V - -
an equal opportunity employer 
ADDENDUM 2 
Photograph looking east along excavated channel with dike in background. 
Looking East along ditch at road crossing (bank 
1 • _ ! . * I \ 
ADDENDUM 3 
Photograph showing earth dike resulting from excavation with 
man pictured in foreground. 
EXHIBIT G-13 
Illustrative of height of dam after fall 1999 
expansion. [Ivan Cowley pictured.] 
ADDENDUM 4 
Memorandum Decision 
District Court 
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FILED 
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h DISTRICT 6t t HI  COURT 
^UNTY 
DISTRICT COURT, PIUTE COUNTY, UTAH 
PIUTE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
JUNCTION, UT 84740 
Telephone: (435) 577-2840 Fax: (435) 577-2433 
OTTER CREEK RESERVOIR COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; RICHFIELD 
IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; SEVIER VALLEY CANAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; MONROE 
SOUTH BEND CANAL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; MONROE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; ELSINORE 
CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
ANNABELLA IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; BROOKLYN CANAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; JOSEPH 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; VERMILLION IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; and PIUTE 
RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 01060014 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Oral argument 
was held on June 20,2006. This matter is now ready for a decision. 
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DECISION 
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be partially granted and 
partially denied. Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should be partially granted 
and partially denied. 
ANALYSIS 
This is a dispute about water rights in a water source called Iron Spring which is located 
high in the Escalante Mountains at about 10,000-feet elevation west of Escalante, Utah in 
Garfield County. It is shown on USGS maps as being in Section 1, Township 33 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The following issues are raised by the cross-motions for summary judgment: (1) whether 
the water source at issue was part of the general adjudication of the Sevier River System in the 
case of Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View Irrigation Company; (2) the sufficiency and 
effect of the notice in that case; (3) whether the Defendant could acquire water rights by adverse 
possession; and (4) whether the Defendant has satisfied all the elements of an adverse possession 
claim. The Court considers each issue in turn. 
1. Was the water source included? 
Defendant argues that the Iron Spring source was not included in the Richlands 
adjudication because the source was not mapped by the State Engineer. More specifically, the 
parties refer to the State of Utah Engineering Department 1924 Index Map of the Upper Sevier 
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River System. This map was prepared by the State Engineer for use in the Richlands case in 
conjunction with his proposed determination of the relative water rights in the Sevier River 
System. (Affidavit of Kirk Forbush in Re Mapping of the Sevier River System, f6.) Iron Spring 
is not shown by name on this map. 
This map shows the Public-Land-Survey Townships and Ranges included in the System. 
Each Township and Range is shown subdivided into its 36 sections. If a section is numbered, the 
number refers to a corresponding map showing that section in greater detail. The only sections 
that were specifically mapped in greater detail were those where water was to be used. Sections 
where water arose were not mapped in detail1. 
The Sevier River has many tributaries. The larger ones are named. These larger 
tributaries have their own, smaller tributaries which include springs and seeps. Usually, these are 
not named. 
The parties have stipulated that Iron Spring is a tributary to Coyote Creek, which is a 
tributary to the East Fork of the Sevier River. Coyote Creek is shown on the 1924 Index Map. It 
is in Townships 31 and 32 South, Ranges 2 West, 1 West, and 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
This is based on the explanation in Forbush Affidavit, \5, It reads: "[t]he mapping by the State 
Engineer focused on the lands where the water was to be used rather than the areas in which the 
water originates. As such, the mapping covered but a small fraction of the hydrologicai area of the 
Sevier River basin." 
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Iron Spring is not shown on the map. Nevertheless, it was included in the Richlands 
litigation. I will explain why I reach this conclusion. 
The Richlands litigation was presided over by Judge LeRoy H. Cox. He issued a final 
decree. It is widely used and cited as the Cox Decree. It contains this language: "This cause has 
been brought... for the purpose of having determined the relative rights of the various claimants 
to the waters of Sevier River and its tributaries, including springs and wells, all of which are 
hereinafter referred to as the Sevier River System." (Decree Adjudicating the Sevier River 
System, Honorable LeRoy H. Cox, Case No. 843, f 1.) 
From this language I conclude that the System was defined by hydrology, meaning the 
combination of geography and the law of gravity. Judge Cox was determined to define the 
relative rights to all the water flowing into the Sevier River Drainage under the forces of 
geography and gravity. 
The water from Iron Spring would naturally flow into the Sevier River Drainage. Hence, 
it was included in the Cox Decree. 
2. Sufficiency of Notice 
Generally, a party is bound by the outcome of a general adjudication only if the notice 
given was reasonably calculated "to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Provo River Water Users Association v. 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993). 
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The Richlands case was filed in Millard County on April 28, 1919. In time it became a 
general adjudication to determine and settle all the rights in the Sevier River System. The State 
Engineer followed the notice procedure outlined in Section 22, Chapter 67 of the Laws of Utah, 
1919. Notices of the litigation were published in the Manti Messenger on October 8,1920 and in 
the Richfield Reaper on October 9, 1920. Those responding were then personally served by the 
State Engineer. 
Unknown claimants were served by publication, as permitted by the court order issued on 
September 22, 1925. The order directed the State Engineer to publish notice of summons in the 
Deseret News. The court had determined that the Deseret News was the paper of "general 
circulation in Kane, Garfield, Piute, Sevier, Sanpete, Juab, and Millard counties and was most 
likely to give notice " (Order, September 22, 1925.) The summons was published in the 
Deseret News for five consecutive Saturdays from October 3,1925 till October 31,1925. 
This evidence is sufficient to show that proper notice was given to the Defendant. 
The Defendant counters this evidence with the Affidavit of Melvin Alvey. This Affidavit 
contains the following statement: "We never received notice of the adjudication conducted for 
the Sevier river and its tributaries, and were not provided an opportunity to make a claim to this 
water in that proceeding, as well." Tf9. 
It is immaterial whether Mr. Alvey or anyone actually read the notice in the Deseret 
News. All that is required to satisfy the notice requirement is that the notice be "reasonably 
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calculated" to reach all potential claimants. In this case, the State Engineer published such a 
notice in the newspaper of general circulation in the counties where potential claimants resided. 
The Affidavit of Melvin Alvey does not raise any issues of material fact and does not preclude 
the finding that the notice was properly given to the Defendant. 
My conclusion is that the Defendant had sufficient notice of the Richlands litigation. 
The parties have stipulated that no statement of claim was filed by Defendant in the 
Richlands case. 
The statute in effect at the time read as follows: " . . . any person, corporation or 
association failing to make and deliver such statement of claim... shall be forever barred and 
estopped from subsequently asserting any rights and shall be held to have forfeited all rights to 
the use of said water " Laws of the State of Utah, Chapter 67, Section 29 (1919)2. 
This Court takes judicial notice of the contents of the decree issued by Judge Cox in the 
Richlands case on November 30, 1936. ("the Cox Decree.") It contains no mention of the 
Defendant nor of its predecessor. 
The Cox Decree adjudicated "the relative rights of various claimants to the waters of 
Sevier River and its tributaries, including springs and wells." Defendant made no claim and 
received no rights in the Iron Spring water source. It forfeited all rights to the use of water 
2
 This statute is still in effect today. The entire legislative history is: History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 29; 
R.S. 1933 AC. 1943,100-4-9. 
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arising therefrom. Its rights were properly determined. 
3, Adverse Possession 
Defendant has advanced an alternative basis for relief in its favor. The basis is adverse 
possession. Specifically, Defendant claims that it began adversely possessing water on 
December 1, 1936 and has done so continuously since then. 
One of the elements of adverse possession is uninterrupted use for seven years, which in 
this case would be from 1936 until 1943. The problem here is that a significant event occurred in 
the midst of that seven-year period. The event was a statute change effected by the legislature in 
1939. 
The statute was Section 100-3-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. In 1939 the Legislature 
added these words to the statute: 
No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated 
can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession3. 
The complete text of the pre-amendment and post-amendment statues is as follows: 
On December 1, 1936 the statute read as follows: 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may 
be acquired by appropriation in the manner hereinafter provided, and not 
otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, 
and, as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in right; 
provided, that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of the 
unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere with a more 
beneficial use of such water, the application shall be dealt with as provided in 
section 100-3-8." Revised Statutes of Utah, Section 100-3-1 (1933). 
After the statute was amended in 1939 it read as follows: 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be 
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The result of the statute change was significant for this caise. After 1939 water rights 
could not be obtained by adverse possession. 
The Defendant's theory is that its adverse possession claim began in 1936 and was in the 
process of ripening as time passed thereafter. Hence, in 1939 the Defendant had some type of 
right, even though it was not a fully ripened adverse possession right. Thus, this Court has to 
decide whether the Defendant's right could still ripen after 1939 regardless of the change in the 
law or whether the 1939 amendment completely extinguished the Defendant's ripening right. 
This is a novel question. I have sought guidance from prior decisions of our appellate 
courts. 
In Wellsville East Field Irrigation Company v. Lindsay Land & Livestock, the Supreme 
Court held that the 1939 amendment was not retroactive. 137 P.2d 634, 656 (Utah 1943). 
The term "retroactive" is not defined in the case. I have found a definition in a law 
dictionary. "Retroactive" means "not intended to impose any new burden, duty, obligation, or 
acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made 
and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the 
state engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The 
appropriation mut be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between 
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in rights; provided, that when a 
use designated by an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters 
of the state would materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, 
the application shall be dealt with as provided in section 100-3-8. No right to the 
use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse 
use or adverse possession. Laws of the State of Utah, Section 100-3-1 (1939). 
(The underlined words are those added by the 1939 amendment.) 
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liability concerning past events." See The Law Dictionary (2002) (Anderson Publishing Co.) 
The past event here was the time period from 1936 to 1939, during which the Defendant 
was in the process of acquiring a water right by adverse possession. If the statute prohibited the 
Defendant from completing the acquisition it would be tantamount to imposing an additional 
burden on the Defendant and would be retroactive in that sense. 
Here, our Supreme Court has determined that the 1939 amendment was not retroactive. 
Hence, Defendant's ripening right should not be burdened and should not be extinguished. 
Plaintiffs counter with the following argument. It is agreed that the 1939 amendment has 
only prospective application and is not retroactive. However, there is a difference between a 
vested right and a ripening right. A prospective statute has no effect on vested rights; they are 
protected. 
Defendant's rights were not vested in 1939. They could not possibly become vested until 
1943. By then the amendment would have been in effect for 4 years and any claim based on 
adverse possession would be prohibited. Since Defendant's rights were not vested in 1939, they 
were extinguished by the amendment. 
Plaintiff's argument is that this is the correct result because it is analogous to the result in 
Utah Public Employees Association v. State, 131 P.3d 208 (Utah 2006). In that case, the 
employee benefits statute was amended in 2005 to allow only 75% of a state employee's banked 
(in other words, accumulated/unused) sick leave accrued prior to January 1, 2006 to be used 
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toward medical and life insurance upon retirement. Id. at 211. The remaining 25% was to be 
contributed to the employee's 401(k) plan. Id. Prior to this amendment, retiring state employees 
could use 100% of their banked sick leave toward medical and life insurance coverage. Id. 
The amendment became effective on January 1, 2006. Every state employee who did not 
retire before that date became subject to this new provision. As a result, most government 
employees suffered a reduction in anticipated post-retirement medical- and life-insurance 
benefits. Several plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the amendment upon the theory 
that it took away their vested rights. 
The Supreme Court held that the rights of the state employees were not vested and would 
not become vested until retirement and that the statute did not work an illegal taking. 
The logic of the Utah Public Employees holding is closely analogous to the facts in the 
case at bar. The following logical chain will illustrate this analogy: 
a. Rights do not vest until all conditions precedent are met. 
b. One of the conditions precedent is seven (7) years of possession or use. 
c. New Escalante did not meet this condition. 
d. Therefore, its rights did not vest. 
e. Conclusion: 
i. Non-vested rights have no value and can be modified at will by legislative 
enactment, 
ii. There was such a legislative enactment, 
iii. New Escalante's rights were deleted by the legislative enactment. 
The problem with this logical chain lies in the connection between steps d and e. I will 
describe the problem that I see. 
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In Utah Public Employees, the Supreme Court was faced with ambiguous statutes. P30 
through P36; also at 216-8. It chose to resolve the ambiguity by engaging in an analysis based on 
contract-law-related principles. Id. P39; also at 219. That particular analytical method served the 
Supreme Court well in the circumstances of that case. The circumstances were an employer-
employee dispute. The Supreme Court found contract-law principles to be useful in resolving 
that type of dispute. The Supreme Court was able to reach a decision and dispose of the appeal. 
However, I see a problem in extending the contract-law-based principles to the facts of 
this case. The facts here do not lend themselves to the type of offer-and-acceptance analysis 
utilized by the Utah Public Employees court. This case is not about employer-employee 
relations. It is a case based on statutory law and common law. 
I conclude that the reasoning of the Utah Public Employees decision is not helpful in 
resolving the legal issues raised by the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. I must 
consider other appellate opinions for guidance. 
It is clear from the Wellsville case that an adverse possessor acquires some type of right 
as against everyone else (except the true owner) even if an adverse possessor is still in the 
process of satisfying the statutory period. This pronouncement was made in the context of 
discussing the interplay between the five-year forfeiture statute and the seven-year adverse 
possession statute. The Wellsville court said the following: 
However, we held that as between the prior owner and the 
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adverser, the adverser could after seven years of open, notorious 
etc., possession, have his title quieted as against the prior owner. 
Hence, we must have held that the adverser got something. If after 
five years of nonuse title reverted to the public, neither the adverse 
nor the prior owner would have any title. At 638-9. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The most unequivocal statement about the effect of the 1939 amendment has been made 
in Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2000). In footnote 19, the 
Supreme Court explained that "following an amendment of Utah's Water Code in 1939, adverse 
use that began before 1939 could still ripen into title after the effective date of the Act." Id. at 
1221. The Supreme Court cites to Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West FieldIrr. Co., 265 P.2d 1016, 
1019 (Utah 1954) and Wellsville at 460-66 in support of this statement. 
Plaintiff argues that footnote 19 is dicta, and that it relied on cases that did not 
specifically hold that the adverse possession right was allowed to ripen if it had been initiated 
before 1939. 
Footnote 19 is dicta because the Supreme Court in Silver Fork was not deciding the 
question of ripening rights. However, the pronouncement may be helpful in trying to predict how 
the Supreme Court would rule on the issue which is before this Court. 
Footnote 19 is connected to the text in P46 (paragraph 46, also at 1221) of the opinion. I 
find it interesting and instructive that the following language is found in the very next paragraph, 
P47 (also at 1222): 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 
01060014, Page -13-
P47 . . . SFPC failed to prove seven years of continuous, 
uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment under 
claim of title, beginning prior to 1939, by any party it may 
legitimately claim as its predecessor-in-interest. (Emphasis added.) 
There is an inference to be drawn from this language. The inference is that proof of the requisite 
possession beginning prior to 1939 could qualify as one of the elements of adverse possession. 
Besides, the Supreme Court's reliance on Mitchell and Wellsville is not misplaced. For 
example, in Mitchell, it was held that since 1939 "the initiation of water rights by this method 
[i.e., adverse possession] has been precluded by statute." At 1019. Thus, it follows that a right 
initiated before 1939 could still ripen into adverse possession claim after 1939. 
The pronouncements in the Wellsville case that support this position have been quoted 
and analyzed above. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant's right initiated in December of 1936 may 
still ripen into a full adverse possession claim, provided the Defendant's use meets other 
necessary elements. 
4. Elements of Adverse Possession 
To establish the right to use water by adverse possession, the Defendant must show that 
its use has been continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and under claim of right for the 
period of seven years. See Wellsville at 279; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp. at 1221. 
Defendant submitted the following affidavits to establish the above elements: (1) 
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Affidavit of Melvin Alvey; (2) Affidavit of Neal Liston; (3) Affidavit of Usher L. Spencer; (4) 
Affidavit of Gail C. Bailey; and (5) Affidavit of Doyle S. Cottam. 
Plaintiff countered with a Motion to Strike those affidavits based on lack of foundation 
and lack of competency. Specific challenges to the affidavits are as follows: 
1. that the affiants born after 1900 testified about facts that occurred in 1875; 
2. that the evidence supplied refers to the time period from 1910 to 1930, which is 
not relevant; and 
3. that the statements concerning the time period from 1930 to 1940 are 
generalizations. 
The elements of adverse possession must have been satisfied by the Defendant during the 
period of 1936 until 1943. Statements concerning adverse use at any other time prior to 1936 or 
after 1943 are immaterial. 
The Affidavit of Melvin Alvey contains one statement in paragraph number 7 concerning 
the relevant time period. It reads: "Since the early 1930's, maintenance on the Ditch has been 
performed with mechanized equipment. The Irrigation Company would hire a backhoe or 
caterpillar out of Panguitch or Salina to rebuild the ditch, whenever it became necessary." 
I think this statement contains specific information based on personal knowledge of the affiant, 
who was an active participant in the affairs of the New Escalante Irrigation Company4. This 
Paragraph 1 of the Affidavit of Melvin Alvey reads: 'The following is my statement concerning 
what is referred to as the "Iron Springs Ditch" . . . and I attest that the knowledge I have attained 
regarding the existence, purpose and use of the Ditch has been accumulated through . . . my 
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statement is permitted to stand. 
All other affidavits contain no relevant information about the existence and exploitation 
of the Ditch from 1936 until 1943. The other affidavits will not be considered. 
Thus, the presented evidence is insufficient to prove every element of adverse possession 
claim. The Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on adverse possession claim 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Iron Spring source was properly included in the Richlands litigation. The Defendant 
received sufficient notice, made no claim, and received no rights in the Iron Spring source. The 
Defendant started adversely possessing the Iron Spring water in 1936. The 1939 amendment to 
the statute does not preclude the Defendant's adverse possession claim. The Defendant did not 
produce sufficient evidence to establish all the necessary elements of adverse possession for the 
purposes of summary judgment. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the 
following issues: (1) that the Defendant was made a party and bound by the general adjudication 
of the Sevier River in the Richlands case; and (2) that the Iron Spring source was properly 
included in the Richlands adjudication. The Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
numerous years of experience in the matters of the New Escalante Irrigation Company . . . as a 
Board Member for 43 years, President of the company for 25 years, 10 years as Water Master of 
said company, and 15 years as Commissioner of Alvey Wash." 
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is denied on the issue that the Defendant has no claim to the Iron Spring source. 
The Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on the following issues: 
(1) that the Defendant acquired diligence rights to the water diverted from the Iron Spring Draw 
area; and (2) that the Cox Decree did not adjudicate those rights The Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is partially denied on the issue of New Escalante's reacquiring rights to Iron 
Spring water by open, notorious, and adverse use beginning the day after entry of the Cox 
Decree because the Defendant did not produce sufficient evidence of that. The Motion is 
partially granted on this issue because the Defendant is permitted to assert its claim of adverse 
possession and establish the requisite elements at trial. D a v i d I 
pate 9/AI< .2006 M o w e r 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
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